9 December 2025
On Tuesday 9 December 2025, at the European Parliament in Brussels, Claude Moniquet delivered a speech on Sudan’s war and on the forces that, in Claude Moniquet’s view, shape the conflict beyond the front lines. The press release places Claude Moniquet’s intervention in the morning but does not provide a start time. Claude Moniquet described the war, which began on 15 April 2023, as a conflict the United Nations frames as “the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crisis”.
Claude Moniquet and the setting of his speech
Claude Moniquet, born on 3 March 1958 in Brussels, is a retired French journalist. According to the biographical note provided, Claude Moniquet worked mainly with L’Express and Quotidien de Paris. Claude Moniquet also served as an intelligence officer with the DGSE, France’s external intelligence service, and Claude Moniquet is described as having operated extensively in eastern Europe and the Balkans. At the European Parliament, Claude Moniquet was presented as a speaker drawing on both reporting experience and intelligence work.
Claude Moniquet on attention in Europe and responsibility for abuses
Claude Moniquet argued that reports of grave crimes in Sudan reach the public sphere, yet they rarely trigger the kind of sustained public mobilisation in Europe that has been visible since October 2023 around the war in Gaza. Claude Moniquet framed this as an observation about attention, empathy and political pressure. Claude Moniquet also stressed that serious violations cannot, in his account, be pinned on a single side, and that both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces are linked to major abuses.
Claude Moniquet on how the war should be read
Claude Moniquet said his focus was not to retell the humanitarian disaster in detail, but to map the power dynamics that could steer the war’s trajectory. Claude Moniquet cautioned against reducing the crisis to a personal rivalry between two generals, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces. For Claude Moniquet, that rivalry matters, but it also hides a deeper structural fault line.
Claude Moniquet portrayed Sudan as a state marked by a long-standing divide, broadly between predominantly Arab-Muslim populations in the north and, in the south, a smaller community of African Christians and followers of traditional religions. Claude Moniquet placed that divide in a history of civil wars and coups, pointing to the 1955–1972 war and the 1983–2005 war that, in Claude Moniquet’s description, was fuelled by attempts to impose sharia nationwide. Claude Moniquet referenced South Sudan’s secession in 2011, which he described as a new state of around 12 million people, mostly Christian and animist. Claude Moniquet also referred to Darfur, where the conflict that began in 2003 was described by Claude Moniquet as a mass killing with between 150,000 and 400,000 deaths, and where militias formed that later fed into the Rapid Support Forces.
Claude Moniquet on Al-Bashir, the Muslim Brotherhood and the 2023 rupture
Claude Moniquet traced today’s institutional landscape back to the 1989 coup that brought General Omar al-Bashir to power, followed, in Claude Moniquet’s account, by three decades of rule. Claude Moniquet highlighted Hassan al-Turabi, a leading figure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, as a key political ally during that era. Claude Moniquet described a later personal break between the two men, while maintaining that the broader Islamist direction endured.
Claude Moniquet then recalled Al-Bashir’s fall in 2019 after four months of protest and the subsequent civil-military transition under Abdallah Hamdok, which announced reforms and a different foreign-policy orientation. Claude Moniquet placed that phase in the context of the Abraham Accords, where Sudan was described as an important component. Claude Moniquet argued that this trajectory did not last: two years later, al-Burhan and Hemedti ended the transition through another coup. Claude Moniquet identified the immediate lead-up to the 2023 war as al-Burhan’s plan to integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the national army, a move that escalated into open fighting.
Claude Moniquet on Islamist networks around the army
Claude Moniquet said he was not seeking to absolve the Rapid Support Forces, which Claude Moniquet linked to major crimes. At the same time, Claude Moniquet asserted that the Sudanese Armed Forces, shaped during the Al-Bashir years, are, in his view, deeply penetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, including parts of the intelligence apparatus, while the Rapid Support Forces were characterised by Claude Moniquet as firmly anti-Islamist.
Claude Moniquet also addressed informal Islamist militias operating alongside the army. Claude Moniquet cited the Bara bin Malik Brigade and described it as significant in certain offensives and recaptures. Claude Moniquet referred to an estimated strength of around 20,000 fighters and argued that their support, as Claude Moniquet sees it, matters for the army’s battlefield momentum.
Claude Moniquet further referenced the legacy of the NISS, the National Intelligence and Security Service, which Claude Moniquet described as more than an intelligence body under Al-Bashir, functioning as an instrument of political control. Claude Moniquet stated that after the NISS was formally dismantled and rebranded, many former members remained active, and that some former cadres would now be fighting, according to Claude Moniquet, on the army’s side.
From this, Claude Moniquet drew a political inference: Claude Moniquet suggested that the military leadership, and al-Burhan in particular, is supported by Islamist networks, alongside a return of influence by figures associated with the former National Congress Party. Claude Moniquet illustrated this with the post-2021 coup release of businessman Abdelbasit Hamza, described by Claude Moniquet as a major financier of Hamas and the Qassam Brigades.
Claude Moniquet on Iran, the Houthis and drones over Sudan
Claude Moniquet then explained why, in Claude Moniquet’s view, this matters beyond Sudan’s borders. Claude Moniquet described Hamas as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and noted that Hamas also receives support from Tehran. Claude Moniquet acknowledged the apparent paradox of cooperation across Sunni and Shia lines, but argued that, as Claude Moniquet frames it, ideology and shared adversaries can outweigh doctrinal divides.
Claude Moniquet argued that a similar pattern can be seen in Sudan. Since 2023, Claude Moniquet said, Iran has moved closer to al-Burhan, with the Houthis in Yemen acting, in Claude Moniquet’s account, as intermediaries. Claude Moniquet stated that equipment presented as humanitarian aid can, in practice, reach the battlefield, and that such support helped the army, according to Claude Moniquet, in key operations including in Khartoum.
Claude Moniquet cited systems mentioned in the press release, including Ababil-2 drones, known as Qasef-2K by the Houthis and as Safaroog by the army, as well as Mohajer-6 and Shahed-136 drones and Fajr-1 radars. Claude Moniquet connected these elements to a broader Iranian strategy that, as Claude Moniquet described it, seeks influence on the Red Sea and new leverage vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.
Claude Moniquet on Gebreil Ibrahim and renewed ties with Tehran
Claude Moniquet also highlighted a third actor that Claude Moniquet said is often overlooked: Gebreil Ibrahim Mohamed Fediel, Sudan’s finance minister and the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement. Claude Moniquet linked the movement historically to Hassan al-Turabi and described Gebreil Ibrahim as central to Sudan’s Islamist project. Claude Moniquet said that, after initial hesitation, Gebreil Ibrahim sided with al-Burhan and brought, in Claude Moniquet’s account, thousands of fighters.
In Claude Moniquet’s telling, Gebreil Ibrahim’s most consequential role lies in restoring relations with Iran. Claude Moniquet stated that Gebreil Ibrahim travelled to Tehran in November 2024 to rebuild ties that had been strained for years.
Claude Moniquet on the Red Sea and Europe’s stake
Claude Moniquet closed with a strategic warning. If the army prevails, Claude Moniquet anticipates a return to a stricter Islamist order and a stronger Iranian foothold in Sudan. Claude Moniquet linked that scenario to the Red Sea’s importance as a corridor for energy flows toward Asia and argued that, even if Europe’s volumes are lower, the exposure remains relevant.
For Claude Moniquet, the case for pushing to end the war is not only humanitarian but also stabilising: Claude Moniquet warned that Sudan could become a long-term flashpoint with regional consequences.
Sources:
European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre (ESISC), press release, 9 December 2025
Claude Moniquet biography as provided by the organiser
Andy Vermaut +32499357495